Inspect TOKN before running anything
In 60 seconds: this is an experimental network with one production bootstrap validator and no verified independent operators. TOKN has no promised exchange value. You can read the site without a wallet. A recipient can use a wallet without running a node. Creating several local nodes does not establish independent consensus. The separate TEST TOKN pilot needs four independent validator controllers in total and three additional contract participants before its full exercise.
Do these three checks before executing project code:
- Confirm the exact release source and SHA-256 through the project's known
announcement. A checksum downloaded from an attacker authenticates nothing.
- Read the selected package's Compose and onboarding files as text. Check image
digests, mounts, ports, capabilities, network access and files created.
- Begin with verification and a wallet-only package. Key generation, message
signing, transaction signing and broadcast are separate deliberate actions.
Exact published identity
The preserved v2.0.0 full-source reference archive is `v2.0.0/release.tar.gz`, with SHA-256 8a439b6ea843b3cb15c905966b2ea410287115633528fecde1f9167ec8fadeb5. Its companion checksums cover the genesis, manifest and deployed contract artifacts too. Production chain ID is 2026090601; its genesis hash is 0xa5a2a901b5f84ce32d5b3c236eb90dbdd0f2e9ef93ce2f4758ec7ae2b29d23c2. Verify before extraction using the portable start steps.
The published v3.2.2 source release, minimal production wallet kit and separate TEST wallet/operator packages are identified by the release index. The TEST deployment has passed publication checks; independent operators and the full external pilot remain separate gates. Published archive digests belong in that external index and the announcement, outside their own archive, to avoid a self-referential checksum. Always use the verified download URL; a private candidate is not a public release.
The v2 full-source package includes maintainer services. Its root and Tor toolbox mounts expose the entire extracted workspace read/write. An environment variable allowlist does not prevent that container from reading other files in the mount. Never put another project's credentials there. Botsync, Cloudflare, the public preview and bootstrap initialization are not wallet prerequisites. New participant onboarding uses the separate minimal kit described by its own inspected README, Compose and onboarding.json.
What the minimal kit must expose
The generated wallet-only kit inventories every included file and its digest. Its wallet package uses the pinned Node runtime, mounts its code and network identity read only, and separates online preparation from offline signing. The signer sees only that kit's one wallet key and transaction files. Online verification, preparation and broadcast do not mount the key. No Docker socket, privileged mode, host PID/IPC namespace, host network or project-root bind belongs in this kit. All capabilities are dropped and the root filesystem is read only; writable locations are explicitly listed in its Compose document. Verify those assertions against that document.
Minimal full-node onboarding is gated on authenticated reachable peer transport. The public wallet kit therefore exposes no unavailable node action or configuration. The separate pilot operator procedure creates each operator's own identity; it must never copy the seed's key. Synchronizing blocks does not admit a validator.
| Operation | Network and persistent effect |
|---|---|
| Inspect checksums, Compose and onboarding JSON | Reads local text; no project execution or signing |
| Pure static preflight in pinned uv image | Reads allowlisted package files; no wallet import, network or Docker socket |
| Pull pinned image | Contacts its registry/CDN; stores image layers in Docker storage |
| Verify chain and status | Contacts the configured HTTPS RPC; reads chain ID, genesis and contract code; no signature |
| Create a wallet | Generates one local private key and public address; no transfer |
| Prepare transaction | Reads RPC state and writes an unsigned intent showing chain, sender, target, amount, data and fees |
| Offline signing | Reads the explicitly selected intent and local key; writes signed bytes with network disabled |
| Broadcast | Sends those signed bytes to the configured RPC; may spend funds and gas |
The public gateway supports reads and broadcast of already signed transactions; it is not a read-only RPC. The endpoint can observe submitted public addresses, requests, transaction bytes and connection metadata. The key never needs to leave the offline signer. Docker's ordinary bridge is not an egress firewall: inspect the implementation and use your own firewall if destination enforcement is needed.
Legacy wallet send signs and broadcasts immediately, without an extra prompt. Legacy claim signs a message. Work, review and validator mutations also sign and broadcast when explicitly invoked. Inspect a complete agreement and runtime code before choosing such an action. Never probe arbitrary maintainer scripts with --help: only the documented guarded help commands are safe for that purpose. Initialization creates keys; deployment deploys contracts; backup verification writes decrypted recovery files. These are not participant preflight actions.
Limits, stopping and recovery
A malicious host, Docker engine, downloaded runtime or wallet implementation can steal a key it can read. File digests detect change; they do not prove safe code. Consensus validates deterministic execution, not useful work. Reviewer addresses do not prove independent people. Read the immutable deadlines, fallback and fees; a payout still needs a running network, transaction inclusion, gas and withdrawal.
The kit's stop command stops only its own Compose project and leaves keys, unsigned intents, signed transactions, receipts and node data on disk. Do not add --volumes or delete its directory as a troubleshooting step. Before uninstalling, make and test a private backup of its wallet/node identity; never upload that backup to the forum. Deleting the only private key permanently loses control of its funds. Removing a container or image does not erase the host bind-mounted files. Keep signed transaction files private until deliberately broadcasting them.
Install Docker on macOS or Linux first. Host uv and just are optional; the default kit uses Docker-only commands. Actual native macOS execution and real independent pilot participation remain distinct evidence gates, not inferred from Linux containers or the presence of an arm64 image manifest.